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SECTION D: U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES

NSC review completed

Discussion Paper

(U) TOPIC: Strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces.

KEY CONSIDERATIONS (U)

o (S) Our most fundamental national security objective is to deter direct attack--particularly nuclear attack--on the United States, its forces, and its allies and friends. The nuclear forces of the United States also, in conjunction with conventional forces, contribute to the deterrence of nonnuclear aggression and to support NATO strategy for the defense of Europe. Deterrence can best be achieved if our defense posture makes Soviet assessment of war outcomes, under any contingency, so uncertain and dangerous as to remove any incentives for initiating attack. This requires that we be convincingly capable of responding in such a way that the Soviets, or any other adversary, would be denied their political and military objectives. Should nuclear attack nonetheless occur, the United States and its allies must prevail and in the process be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities at the lowest possible level of violence and on terms favorable to the United States.

o (S) The United States remains committed to a deterrent use of military strength; our objective is to deter aggression or to respond to it should deterrence fail. As a consequence our strategy is designed to insure the realization of our objectives after the enemy has seized the first initiative, to deny him his political and military goals and to counterattack so strongly that we inflict an unacceptably high cost on the enemy.

o (S) Our strategy is founded on the ability to provide the initial, trans- and post-attack target coverage required by NSSD-13. Similarly, we must meet the existing requirements for damage limitation, flexibility of options, crisis stability, escalation control, support of allied commitments, preservation of the continuum of conventional and nuclear deterrence, maritime nuclear employment and forward deployment of non-strategic nuclear forces.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

2

(S) DISCUSSION: U.S. ability to execute the elements of our strategy is presented in the attached matrix of nuclear forces capabilities. Given our current forces and related command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I), not all elements of our strategy are fully executable today. The relentless Soviet drive for superiority, coupled with years of relative U.S. inactivity, has resulted in the weakening of some parts of our deterrence posture.

(S) A number of important observations condition this finding:

- o neither our goals nor our strategy have been invalidated or put into question. The soundness of both is demonstrated by our ability to deter successfully war with the Soviet Union for over three decades;

- o the correction of many of the specific shortfalls identified in the matrix has been addressed by NSDD-12 and NATO's decision to modernize its deterrent force. Despite intense Soviet counterpressure and the magnitude of the task, significant progress has been realized in both areas;

- o by July of 1982, the Department of Defense will provide a Master Plan which identifies in a comprehensive and detailed fashion where shortfalls exist in our strategic forces and C³I and how we intend to synchronize our employment and acquisition policies to minimize risk. Future iterations of the Master Plan will also address non-strategic nuclear forces and associated C³I.

- o finally, as we pursue our modernization efforts to correct these shortfalls we must ensure that our arms control positions are synchronized with and complementary to our programmatic actions.

(S) CONCLUSION: While the full realization of the program outlined in NSDD-12 will not occur until well into the next decade, shortfalls accumulated over the years cannot be overcome over night. Persistence in the implementation of our long-term force modernization programs is the best way to assure the restoration of our ability to fully execute all elements of our strategy.

(S) Similarly, during this rebuilding period we must display consistency in our strategy, goals and declaratory policy. We must continue to assure friend and foe alike of the steadfastness of our purpose.

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NUCLEAR FORCES CAPABILITIES MATRIX (U)

<u>Elements of Strategy</u>	<u>Strategic</u>	<u>Non-Strategic</u>	<u>Common to Both</u>
Initial Target Coverage	Insufficient Time Urgent Hard Target Kill	Range Limited Force Mix; Inadequate Mobile Target Coverage; Obsolescence	Insufficient Survivability and Connectivity
Target Coverage for Protracted Conflict and for Protection and Coercion	->	->	Limited Endurability & Survivability; Inadequate C ³ I
Damage Limitation	->	->	Inadequate Ability to Limit Damage To U.S. & Allies
Strategic Defense	Obsolete Systems; Lack of Endurance; Lack of Survivability; No ASAT	N/A	N/A
Range of Options	->	->	Adaptive Planning Inadequate
Crisis Stability	->	->	Limited Survivability
Escalation Control	->	->	Insufficient C ³ I and Survivability; Lack of Leverage
Support for Alliance Commitments and Preserving Defense Continuum	Inadequate Non-Strategic Coordination	Conventional Deficiency	Credible Linkage Declining
Maritime Nuclear Employment	N/A	Obsolescence & Range Limited Force Mix	N/A
Forward Deployment	N/A	Security, Survivability, Maldeployment	N/A

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